President's Commission on Organized Crime


Report to the President
and the
Attorney General


THE EDGE:
Organized Crime,
Business, and Labor Unions


PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME

HONORABLE IRVING R. KAUFMAN, CHAIRMAN

Jesse A. Brewer, Jr.

Manuel J. Reyes

Carol Corrigan

Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr.*

Justin J. Dintino

Charles H. Rogovin

William J. Guste

Barbara A. Rowan

Judith R. Hope

Francis A. Sclafani

Philip R. Manuel

Samuel R. Skinner

Thomas F.McBride

Honorable Strom Thurmond

Eugene H. Methvin

Phyllis T. Wunsche

Edwin L. Miller

James D. Harmon, Jr.
Executive Director and Chief Counsel


 

 

*Commissioner Rodino, in view of his position as Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, takes no position concerning the recommendations included in Section Eleven of this Report.

 

Table of Contents

o Summary of Recommendations

o Foreword

Section One

Overview and Summary of Recommendations

Section Two

A Look at Modern Labor Racketeering: The Methods and Objectives of Corruption

Section Three

International Longshoremen's Association

Section Four

Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union

Section Five

International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Section Six

Laborers International Union of North America

Section Seven

The Independent Unions

Section Eight

Organized Crime and the Meat Industry: A Study in Competition

Section Nine

Organized Crime and the Construction Industry: A Study in Collusion

Section Ten

Current Laws and Strategy

Section Eleven

Recommendations for a National Strategy

Section Twelve

The Labor Management Racketeering Act of 1986
 

SECTION SIX:

THE LABORERS- INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA [LIUNA]

A CASE WAITING TO BE MADE

Introduction

The Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA), formed in 1903, is one of 15 unions that belong to the Building Construction Trades Departments of the AFL-CIO. It represents approximately 400,000 laborers in more than 900 locals around the nation and in Canada. Of all construction workers, laborers perform the dirtiest, most strenuous, and some of the most dangerous jobs. They do demolition, blasting, and excavation tasks. They pour cement and move debris. They also carry out a variety of other tasks, such as removing asbestos, which are sometimes done by other union groups; thus, they function as a ready source of substitute labor on the construction site.

The typical laborer has a limited formal education and few skills. He depends on the collective strength of the union to provide job security, a fair wage, and health and pension benefits. If the union's leadership is corrupt -- if the leaders steal or misuse workers' funds or if they accept payoffs to permit employers to overwork, underpay, replace workers or disregard job safety measures -- the individual has limited recourse.

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Collectively laborers play an essential and pivotal role in the construction industry. If organized crime influences the laborers' union, it is in a powerful position to pressure and threaten contractors. As the case study of the New York City construction industry in this report demonstrates, organized crime can use its influence over the union to exact payoffs, force contractors to deal with organized crime-affiliated suppliers or subcontractors, or punish legitimate unions by substituting lower cost laborers in place of a higher cost trade union.

Based on reports of Federal law enforcement and its own investigation, the Commission has found that organized crime has a documented relationship with at least 26 LIUNA locals, 3 district councils, as well as the International Union.

Organized Crime's Influence

The International

On the international level organized crime exerts its influence principally through top officers who are associates of organized crime. This judgment is supported by surveillances of LIUNA General President Angelo Fosco meeting with members of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra group known to its members as the "Outfit". For example, Fosco was observed meeting with Paul DeLucia, former

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leader of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra; and Dominic Blasi, member of the Chicago LCN.l

According to former union officers, Fosco does not have a reputation for being a dynamic or influential leader within the union, but he does have the power to authorize expenditures of union funds and award certain patronage jobs, including posts known as "special international representatives." Fosco has named as special international representatives convicted Chicago LCN territorial boss Al Pilotto and indicted Laborer's official and St. Louis LCN boss Matthew Trupiano.2

One of LIUNA's vice presidents is John Serpico. Serpico is also president of LIUNA Local 8 in Chicago.3 In testimony before the Commission in 1985, Serpico admitted that he is a friend or personal acquaintance of virtually every important organized crime leader in Chicago.4 These include Tony Accardo, the "boss of the bosses" in the Chicago La Cosa Nostra, and Joseph Aiuppa and Jackie Cerone, the LCN's principal underbosses to Accardo. Serpico also knows several LCN territorial bosses who report to Aiuppa and Cerone, including Vincent Solano, president of LIUNA Local 1, Al Pilotto, formerly president of LIUNA Local 5, and Joseph Ferriola, who Serpico stated was a "close personal friend".5

As president of Local 8, Serpico has employed LCN members to serve as the local's officers and agents. Business agent

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Fiore Buccieri is the son of deceased LCN territorial boss "FiFi" Buccieri. Business agent Steve Torello is the son of deceased LCN territorial boss "Turk" Torello. The union's lawyer is Jack Cerone, the son of LCN underboss Jackie Cerone.6

For approximately seven years Chicago LCN member John Fecarotta was listed as a Local 8 "business agent" and "organizer." Fecarotta, himself a boss in the Chicago LCN, reports to territorial boss Angelo La Pietra.7 In his testimony to the Commission Serpico could not relate a single specific contribution that Fecarotta made to Local 8. Serpico did recall that Fecarotta, in addition to his salary, was given a union car for providing two organizing "tips" to the union. Neither Serpico nor Fecarotta could remember what those "tips" were. In fact, when questioned by the Commission, Fecarotta could not remember anything he did for the union. He did not know any terms of the union's collective bargaining agreement or its pension plan. He did not know what information was on membership cards he claimed to have handed out. He did not know the name of management employees or union stewards with whom he dealt.8 Fecarotta was apparently a "ghost" employee who received an unearned salary and apparently used his union position as a legitimate cover.

Organized crime has also used LIUNA to gain access to the political arena. For example, John Serpico, LIUNA International vice president and Local 8 president, has maintained an active relationship with LCN leaders; at the same time, he is a Chicago

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civic leader of some importance. Serpico has served multiple terms as a member, and has served as the chairman of the Chicago Regional Port Authority.9 This position provides a salary over and above his union salary, and could provide a source for patronage jobs and contracts. Serpico told the Commission that, while Chicago Mayors Daley and Byrne and Illinois Governors Walker and Thompson were in office, each received or returned his phone calls as a matter of course.10 Serpico's relationship with Democratic and Republican office holders could provide the opportunity for him to use his union position to advance the interests of his organized crime acquaintances.

The Locals

As Serpico's Local 8 illustrates, organized crime's influence over LIUNA is most extensive at the local level. This control is particularly concentrated in large cities, such as Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis, and New York, as well as smaller cities such as in New Jersey.

The best documented examples are influenced locals in the Chicago region. Again, the degree of the control is relative to the number of union offices held by LCN members or their relatives. For example, LIUNA Local 1 in Chicago provides a safe haven for known members and leaders of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra.

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The president of Local 1 is Vincent Solano, a territorial boss of the LCN Outfit on the north side of Chicago. Ken Eto, an LCN associate, who knew Solano for many years and reported to him for almost a decade, described Solano's operation and the territory he controls in testimony before the Commission.

According to Eto, Solano controlled all forms of illegal gambling, including poker, bolita, ziganetta, horse bookmaking and sports bookmaking in his area. Solano also ran extortion rackets against bars, restaurants, topless clubs, pornographic bookstores, and massage parlors, and supplied these businesses with vending machines, such as cigarette and jukeboxes. Solano used the Local's headquarters as a contact point for his criminal organization. Eto told of how Solano confirmed meetings at prearranged locations near the union hall and met with members of his crew to receive payoffs, give directions, and, in the words of Eto, receive "respect" from those who worked for him. Eto personally paid Solano a share of the proceeds of his illegal gambling operations. At Solano's direction Eto made regular payments to other LCN members.ll

Solano apparently suspected that Eto might become a government informant, and he ordered him killed. On February 10, 1983, John Gattuso and Jasper Campise, members of Solano's group, shot Eto three times in the back of the head while the three were allegedly on their way to meet Solano for dinner. Miraculously, Eto lived, and subsequently became an FBI informant.l2 On July

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14, 1983, the mutilated and strangled bodies of Campise and Gattuso were found in the trunk of a car in Naperville, Illinois. Without the testimony of Campise and Gattuso there is little chance that corroborative evidence can be found to convict Solano of Eto's attempted murder. Solano remains president of Local 1.

LIUNA Local 1 vice president is Salvatore Gruttadauro. The recording secretary is Frank "Babe" DeMonte. Both Gruttadauro and DeMonte are members of the LCN whom Eto stated directed groups of criminal soldiers and associates.13 Gruttadauro is presently awaiting trial on charges of violating the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. 186 in the Northern District of Illinois (No. 85-Cr-731). Gruttadauro owns an interest in the Triple A Chemical Toilet Company, which rents portable toilets to construction sites and to the City of Chicago. DeMonte is a second generation member of La Cosa Nostra; his father was a member in the Chicago LCN.14 DeMonte has served time in jail for contempt rather than testify before a grand jury. DeMonte assists Solano in the operation of his illegal activities.l5

Chicago LIUNA Local 5 is another influenced local union. Former special international representative and local president Al Pilotto, who also served as vice president of the Laborers District Council in Chicago, is an LCN territorial boss. Another LCN member who has served as a union officer is Dominic Palermo, field representative.

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In 1981, in law enforcement's single major case against LIUNA racketeering, United States v. Accardo, Pilotto was indicted with LIUNA general president Fosco, LCN boss Tony Accardo, and other LIUNA officials for looting the union's health and welfare funds. In July 1981 Pilotto was shot by mob hit men while playing golf. Pilotto survived and was ultimately convicted in the insurance fraud scheme.

LIUNA locals in Chicago are not isolated instances of organized crime's control over the union. For example, in St. Louis the connection between the LCN and the Laborers Union is Matthew Trupiano, the president of Local 110 and boss of the St. Louis LCN family; and in New Jersey Local 394 business manager John Riggi is underboss and acting boss of the DeCavalcante family.

The Commission's attempts to explore LIUNA officers' ties to organized crime were repeatedly hampered by certain officers' refusal to cooperate with the Commission's investigations. LIUNA general president Fosco and other LIUNA officers repeatedly refused to answer questions or testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination.

Labor Racketeerinq at LIUNA

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Organized crime has used its influence over the Laborers' union to obtain workers' benefit funds, provide no-show jobs for LCN members, pay the personal expenses of union officials, gain access to the political process, and (as discussed in the case study of the New York construction industry), manipulate the construction market.

John Serpico, president of LIUNA Local 8 and president of Central States Joint Board Health and Welfare Trust Fund, provides an example. In January 1985 the Commission began to examine in detail the dental program of the Central States Joint Board Health and Welfare Trust Fundl6 (Local 8 was one of the eight unions affiliated with this fund) and the roles that administrator Robert J. Cantazaro and union executive John Serpico played in that $5 million benefit plan. This investigation disclosed that the Chicago LCN apparently participated in a scheme to siphon off hundreds of thousands of dollars from LIUNA Local 8's dental plans.17 The front man for the scheme was Cantazaro.

The scheme began in the spring of 1976 when John Serpico introduced Cantazaro to the trustees of the Fund as an "insurance specialist."18 In fact, Cantazaro at the time was a bail bondsman who dabbled in insurance from his home office. He had no prior experience in administering dental plans and providing dental care. As a bidder for the Fund's dental contract, Cantazaro presented his dental plan to the trustees for their

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approval. Three other bidders also presented plans. Because Cantazaro also acted as the Board's insurance broker, he had solicited and reviewed these competitive proposals, a fact not disclosed to the trustees.l9

On September 16, 1976, Cantazaro was formally awarded the Fund's contract for a dental program. Under the contract Cantanzaro was to operate a clinic in a building he owned and rented to the Fund, process members' claims, and perform other administrative tasks. Fifteen months after the clinic began operations, it closed. The clinic ended its operations just when there were complaints that more clinics were needed to improve service to the membership. Sufficient funds had already accumulated to build additional clinics but, instead of opening more clinics, Cantazaro closed the one that seemed to operate satisfactorily.20

Under Cantazaro's new agreement to process members' claims and perform other administrative functions, he did not provide any actual dental services. He simply paid claims as they were presented to his insurance company. From January 1, 1978 through December 31, 1983, Cantazaro received $5,131,000 in insurance premiums. More than 68 percent of this money was used to pay corporate overhead and profits for Cantazaro's companies. The Commission's investigation disclosed that, of total insurance premiums paid, approximately $ 2.5 million was directly traced to Cantazaro and his family.21

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The Commission's investigation of the dental fund scheme was hampered by the refusal of several witnesses to testify. On March 21, 1985, Robert Cantazaro was immunized by the Commission but refused to answer any questions and was imprisoned for contempt.22 John Fecarotta, former Laborers Local 8 business agent and an LCN member, was also subpoenaed and compelled to testify. Three days prior to a hearing to consider whether he should be held in contempt, Fecarotta claimed he suffered angina and diabetes attacks. Fecarrotta checked himself into hospitals in three states, and ultimately answered questions by deposition from his hospital bed.

The Commission found that only 32 cents of every dollar contributed to the Central States Joint Board Health and Welfare Trust Fund dental plan was applied to members' benefits.23 The case underlines the need for new efforts to prevent the loss of benefit fund money paid to fund administrators who charge grossly inflated service fees. Despite Cantazaro's extraordinary profits and despite the evidence of his organized crime connections, he apparently violated no federal law in handling union funds. At a Commission hearing George Lehr, the current executive director of the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund, commented on the administrative fees paid in the Cantazaro case:

I find it outrageous. It's a ripoff on its face. Our administrative costs, which we are unhappy with, are 6.8 percent. They are down from a little over 8 percent.

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I would tell you 25 percent was a ripoff. There is nothing to describe 68 percent in my opinion.24

In addition, if the trustees of this Fund had employed basic precautions the breach of fiduciary responsibility evident in the Cantazaro case might have been avoided. These include using an independent consultant to evaluate competitive bids, ascertaining to whom brokers' fees and commission had been paid, and requiring in-depth periodic reports by the benefit plan provider about utilization, service received, cost of administration, and the amount of trust monies actually spent to provide benefits.

In other abusive spending incidents LIUNA's top officers have disbursed union funds for so many extraordinary expenditures, particularly for the payment of criminal defense fees, that at one point the international had insufficient income to pay its monthly bills.25 In one incident the union appropriated over $550,000 to pay the legal fees of Angelo Fosco in the United States v. Accardo trial. LIUNA officers have taken the position that all defense costs incurred prior to issuance of an indictment are legitimate expenses if the target of a grand jury is a union officer.26 Accordingly, legal defense costs stemming from criminal charges -- even charges arguably unrelated to the officer's union responsibilities -- will be paid for by the union.

Another spending incident involved the second ranking member of the international's hierarchy, secretary-treasurer Arthur E.

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Coia.27 Coia, with Fosco's acquiescence, spent approximately $200,000 of the membership's money to hire a private investigative firm to keep track of the United States Government's investigation of LIUNA. The private investigative firm never provided specific details of services provided to LIUNA, but Coia personally ordered that the bills be paid.28

Coia also attempted to obtain substantial attorney's fees from the union. Coia obtained assistance for his son, a LIUNA officer in Rhode Island, who petitioned the international for $40,000 to pay legal fees stemming from a government investigation of the union. When the international's controller sent this bill to LIUNA's general counsel for authorization, Coia ordered the legal bills to be paid without question.29

 

The Persistence of Organized Crime Influence: Manipulation of Union Governance and Violence

Like other unions influenced by organized crime, LIUNA's internal structure perpetuates the existing leadership. Since LIUNA Executive Board members are elected at-large, it is almost certain there can be little effective opposition to national officers within the union. First, there is no power base upon which the opposition can rely. Consequently, opposition candidates run against a unified slate, and must conduct national campaigns. Second, LIUNA holds its conventions once every five years, the legal maximum under the Landrum-Griffin Act, and the elected at-large executive board fills all vacant executive board

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positions. The infrequency of LIUNA conventions, coupled with the power to appoint executive board vacancies, leaves few offices contested. When the use of violence and intimidation are added, the membership has little opportunity to express itself democratically.30

As an illustration of the ability of an incumbent to control the union convention, general president Angelo Fosco, while under indictment for racketeering activities against the union, won election to a full term. Fosco's electoral success is also attributable to use of force and threats of violence against potential competitors. Fosco personally threatened long-time international vice-president Robert Powell with death, confronting Powell in public at a LIUNA dinner several months before the convention.31 At the Commission's public hearing in Chicago, Powell testified that Fosco's ties to the Chicago LCN made such a threat believable.32 Fosco was subpoenaed to appear at a Commission deposition and called to testify at a public. Hearing he refused to answer questions, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.33

LIUNA secretary-treasurer Arthur Coia also tried to influence Robert Powell's decision not to seek the union's presidency. Powell was one of the few black leaders in a union whose membership is between 50 and 65 percent non-white. Powell testified under oath that Coia informed him that the "Italians"

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had organized LIUNA, and no one outside that group could ever take control. Powell understood this to mean that Coia was referring to a traditional organized crime group, not the ethnic Italians in the union's rank and file.34

Powell received other anonymous death threats. On one occasion, a dead rat was placed on his car. Later, a pair of dead pigeons was left in the same place. Threatening telephone callers asked Powell if his life insurance was paid up and whether he "liked breathing." One caller suggested Powell should be careful to give testimony in a certain way in a civil case that rank and file members initiated against Fosco, LIUNA general counsel Robert Connerton, and others.35 As a result of these threats, Powell gave false testimony in the lawsuit, which he recanted when questioned by the Commission.36 Powell was forced to take certain precautions, such as sending his wife to live in another city for over a year. He wore a bullet-proof vest and carried a handgun. Powell declined to run for International president, and, within two years of Fosco's initial threat, he retired. During this same period the union's comptroller believed his office and home phone might be tapped.

He told the Commission that his employers were concerned about "leaks."37

At the 1981 LIUNA convention a symbolic candidate, who had no chance of winning the election, was beaten by fellow delegates

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in full view of the convention when he attempted to speak on the floor.38

Other Laborers officials have been murdered. For example, on January 17, 1982, 49 year old Bienvenido Medina, the long time recording secretary of the Philadelphia area Hod Carriers Local 332, was beaten to death by five masked men who visited his home in the middle of the night. Medina was murdered several days after he resigned his office and announced his candidacy for business agent of the local.

The chilling effect of such violence cannot be lost on local leaders or rank and file union members.

A Weak Governmental Response

The government has done little to end organized crime's hold over LIUNA. Its efforts have taken the form of criminal prosecutions, and even these have been only partially successful. The most important criminal case was United States v. Accardo, which began in 1981 with the indictment of LIUNA general president Angelo Fosco, Chicago LCN bosses Tony Accardo and Al Pilotto, other LIUNA officials, and a number of businessmen. Joseph Hauser, who carried out massive insurance fraud against the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund, as well as other union health and welfare trust funds in Florida, Indiana,

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Massachusetts, and Arizona, was named as an unindicted co-conspirator.39

The defendants were charged with racketeering activities against local LIUNA health and welfare funds that consisted of setting up insurance companies and inducing the LIUNA locals to funnel business to them. The conspirators then looted the pool of assets generated by the high insurance premiums charged by the union. One witness at the defendants' trial, Daniel Milano, testified that union general president Fosco regularly accepted kickbacks and payoffs for his part in the racketeering scheme. Other testimony established that Fosco's son, Paul, was part of one Hauser-created insurance firm that contracted with LIUNA officials. After a lengthy trial, the jury acquitted Fosco and Accardo but convicted the other defendants, including: LCN leader Al Pilotto, president of LIUNA Local 5; John Giardiello, president of Fort Lauderdale LIUNA Local 767; Salvatore Tricario, business agent and welfare fund trustee of Local 767; Bernard Rubin, a Florida LIUNA official and fund trustee; and Seymour Gopman, a prominent labor lawyer.

In another case a federal grand jury indicted the second ranking member of the LIUNA international hierarchy, secretary-treasurer Arthur F. Coia, and charged him with racketeering violations against the unions' benefit funds. The government alleged that Coia received payoffs in return for steering union insurance business to selected companies. Coia's

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friend and acquaintances include such persons as Joe Hauser, who specialized in looting Laborers' health and welfare funds, often with the cooperation of Laborers' officials. Coia and his son were involved with Hauser's schemes.40 Hauser was overheard discussing the importance of Coia with the powerful LCN boss of New Orleans, Carlos Marcello.41 The conversation implies that Coia is a trusted associate:

Hauser: Carlos listen to me, I'm meeting with Arthur tomorrow. I don't know if you know about it.

Marcello: Who?

Hauser: Arthur Coia, and I'm meeting with him, listen to me carefully, he's going to give me some money tomorrow. These guys have been supporting me, theirs is blood, blood's thicker than water you know.

The case against Coia was dismissed because the indictment was filed after the statute of limitations had run on the allegations.

The Waiting Case

Although LIUNA has not achieved the notoriety of the Teamsters' Union, it is nevertheless a union with clear ties to organized crime. This is particularly unfortunate because, perhaps more than any other group of workers, laborers need a strong and honest union. The Commission believes there is little chance that the LIUNA membership will be able to eliminate

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organized crime's influence, or control their union, if the current leadership or governance structure remains intact. The Commission believes that federal law enforcement agencies should give high priority to investigations of LIUNA and its locals.

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FOOTNOTES

1 These La Cosa Nostra leaders were subjects of routine surveillance by a number of law enforcement agencies. The Commission has interviewed agents who observed and identified Fosco in such routine meetings during 1966 and 1967.

2 Deposition of Thomas W. Needham, LIUNA Comptroller, before the President's Commission on Organized Crime, May 28, 1985.

3 LM - 2 Reports of LIUNA.

4 Deposition of John Serpico before the President's Commission on Organized Crime, April 16, 1985.

5 Serpico has utilized his personal monies for outside investments. One investment he made was in a business known to Chicago law enforcement as a La Cosa Nostra front, Chicago Studio Rentals, Inc., through John Credidio, who Ken Eto informed the Commission is an associate of LCN member Joseph Ferriola. Serpico claims he lost $75,000 in that business. Organized Crime and Labor-Management Racketeering: Hearings before the President's Commission on Organized Crime, April 24, 1985 at 497 (testimony of John Serpico) [hereinafter Labor-Management Racketeerinq Hearings].

6 Deposition of John Serpico, supra.

7 Labor-Management Racketeering_Hearings, supra note 5 at 42 (testimony of Ken Eto.)

8 Deposition of John Fecarotta, May 22-23, 1985.

9 Deposition of John Serpico, supra note 4.

1O Id

11 See Labor-Management Racketeering Hearings, supra note 5, at 12-44.

12 Id.

13 Id

14 Interview with Ken Eto, DeMonte's father was listed in charts of the Outfit prepared by the McClellan Commission.

15 Labor-Management Racketeering Hearings, supra note 5, at 12-44.

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16 This Fund is unrelated to the Teamsters' Central States Pension Fund.

17 Labor-Management Racketeering Hearings, supra note 5, at 456-462 (testimony of PCOC staff investigator John Walsh).

18 Id.

19 Id.; deposition of Charles Schiffman, Apri1 12, 1985.

20 Labor-Management Racketeering Hearings, supra note 5, at 456-462.

21 Id.

22 Cantazaro's incarceration has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In Re Sealed Case 776 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As of publication of this report, Cantazaro remains incarcerated.

23 Id.

24 Labor-Management Racketeering Hearings, supra note 5, at 600.

25 Deposition of Thomas N. Needham, supra note 2.

26 See Testimony of Robert Connerton, Jan. 9, 1985 in United States v. George Osley, Jr., and Bernard Hawkins, Cr. 84-177 HDM (D. Las Vegas).

27 United States v. Coia,___ F.2d_____ (llth Cir. 198 _).

28 Id.

29 Deposition of Thomas N. Needham, supra note 2.

30 See Appendix, 8 rooks and Gamm, A Union Democracy as a Deterrent to Corruption and Organized Crime.

31 Labor-Manaqement Racketeering Hearings, supra note 5, at 99-128 (testimony of Robert Powell

32 Id

33 Id. at 128-135 (testimony of Angelo Fosco).

34 Id. at 99-128.

35 See White v. Fosco, Cir. No. 81-1500 (D. C. 1981).

36 General Counsel Connerton has brought a counter-quit against Powell, who was not a plaintiff in the lawsuit, and is seeking over a $1 million in damages for Powell's alleged part in a conspiracy to embarrass Connerton and take over the union.

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37 Deposition of Thomas W. Needham, supra note 2.

38 Labor-Maneqement Racketeering Hearings, supra note 5 at 99-128;deposition of Robert Powell before the President's Commission on organized crime.

39 See generally S. Rep. No. 427, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979)

40 See Labor Union Insurance: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1979).

41 FBI transcript of court authorized intercept at the Maison Dupuy Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 2, 1979.

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> See Labor Union Insurance: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1979).

41 FBI transcript of court authorized intercept at the Maison Dupuy Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 2, 1979.

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p> See Labor Union Insurance: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1979).

41 FBI transcript of court authorized intercept at the Maison Dupuy Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 2, 1979.

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See Labor Union Insurance: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1979).

41 FBI transcript of court authorized intercept at the Maison Dupuy Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 2, 1979.

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